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Hospital operations is a broad description of a complex field, but its complexity does not 
diminish its importance. Delivering health to communities is challenging, and even minor hiccups can 
cause severe ripple effects. In 2020, the globe was faced with an unprecedented public health crisis, 
which presented an unprecedented disruption to healthcare. Hospitals were quick to respond, but as the 
crisis in the US has surpassed one year, many hospitals are coming to terms with the unsustainability 
of interventions that were never intended to be long-term solutions. Healthcare at its core is about 
people – both patients and staff – but if corrective action is not taken immediately, the long-term impact 
on the wellbeing of communities has tremendous public health significance. This document sets forth 
an account of hospital operations throughout the pandemic, highlights the challenges faced by 
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It takes a village to run a hospital. In the United States, hospitals are diverse, complex 
entities tasked with one of the most important roles in society: managing the health of a community. 
Finding one standard set of operating guidelines that easily applies to all – or even most – hospitals 
in the US is virtually impossible, which highlights why it is so difficult to understand the 
complexities of hospital operations at a glance.  
Of course, as any biologist would attest, the more complex an organism is, the more 
opportunities there are for things to go wrong. This concept can be applied to many different types 
of systems, and healthcare is no exception. Leaving non-hospital entities alone for now, imagine 
all of the functional areas involved in hospital operations. One’s mind likely turns quickly to the 
clinical staff that perform surgeries, administer medication, and tend to the care needs of healthcare 
consumers, but there is a network of non-clinical ancillary and support services that is vital to 
ensuring business runs smoothly in hospitals on a day-to-day basis. In 2020, healthcare was faced 
with a once-in-a-lifetime disruption to business-as-usual: the COVID-19 pandemic.  
Long before 2020, alarm bells have sounded as healthcare costs in this country continue to 
rise without commensurate increases in the wellbeing of the population. Hospitals and other 
healthcare stakeholders have been saddled with one over-arching behemoth of a goal: keep doing 
what you’re doing, but do it better and at lower cost. Now, as a novel viral contagion threatens the 
lives and livelihoods of millions of Americans, that task seems even more daunting. Some of the 
progress that has been made in the past few years has been upended as consumers attempt to 
mitigate personal risk and hospitals have been forced to reimagine their workflows. This disruption 
has also exposed new avenues for progress and kindled hope for a brighter future. One thing is 
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certain, however: the COVID-19 pandemic has engendered or highlighted immediate needs within 
the hospital industry that must be addressed in the very near future.  
This paper will delve into the world of hospital operations during the greatest public health 
crisis that this country has faced in a century. In particular, this paper focuses on the flagship 
hospital of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) – a large integrated delivery and 
financing system (IDFS) in Western Pennsylvania – with supporting accounts from other Western 
PA hospitals. The information presented subsequently is based largely off of UPMC staff 
interviews. A common theme is apparent throughout this document: the current operating standards 
in hospitals across the country are not sustainable, even in the short-term. If decisive legislative 
action is not taken in the first quarter of 2021, some currently worst-case scenarios will become 
very realistic. To speculate on what those scenarios might be at this time would be counter-
productive, but any outcome in this arena would likely have devastating effects on the long-term 
health and wellbeing of the American populace. 
1.1 Background 
UPMC operates more than 40 hospitals across Pennsylvania, Maryland, New York, 
and overseas. Its flagship system, UPMC Presbyterian Shadyside, is located in the heart of 
Pittsburgh, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. Presbyterian Shadyside actually consists of 
multiple hospitals and other clinical buildings distributed across two separate campuses. 
Together, this flagship hospital network has over 1,200 beds and provides world-class care in 
nearly every major adult specialty (University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, 2021). 
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Pittsburgh is the second-most populous city in Pennsylvania behind Philadelphia, and 
the Pittsburgh metropolitan area is home to over 2 million people. The area’s blue-collar 
background is reflected in a racial makeup that is over 80% white, with less than 40% of the 
population over age 25 holding at least a bachelor’s degree and a median household income of 
about $50,000 (US Census Bureau, 2019). The region became an important manufacturing and 
heavy industry hub in the late-1800s. For most of the 20th century, Pittsburgh-based US Steel 
was the leading global producer of steel, accounting for nearly a third of global steel output in 
its first year (Funding Universe, 2003). Today, the region’s economy is dominated by 
healthcare, education, technology, and finance. 
 
Figure 1. UPMC Presbyterian hospital 
As manufacturing jobs left the United States and moved overseas in the late-1900s, the 
number of people in Western PA fell, too. Pittsburgh’s population declined more than 50% 
between 1950 and 2010 (Population.us, 2016). Today, more than half of the population is age 40 
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or older; a community health assessment performed by Allegheny County in 2015 found that the 
most pressing health issues in the Pittsburgh area included aging, chronic disease, the opioid 
epidemic, access to care, and cultural disparities, among others (Kurta et al., 2015). These 
healthcare considerations are not uncommon among rust-belt and midwestern cities, but they 
highlight the challenges that the region was focused on before 2020.  
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2.0 Timeline of the Pandemic in Western Pennsylvania 
By late January 2020, as US media outlets began picking up on news about the novel 
coronavirus from abroad, most Americans went about their daily lives without significant 
interruption, at most watching unfolding events with detached interest. Healthcare 
professionals, for the most part, were no different. Save pulmonary and infectious disease 
specialists, most providers were focused on what was in front of them, and the news cycle 
pertaining to healthcare was focused on changes to the ACA, hospital closures and mergers, 
and the flu season. In fact, Allegheny County was considered the epicenter of Pennsylvania’s 
flu season in January 2020 (Hamill, 2020), likely drawing a lot of the attention of state and 
county epidemiologists.  
Fast forward one month, and it was beginning to become clear that this novel virus was 
not merely a foreign problem. The US publicly reported its first COVID-19-related deaths on 
February 26th (Fuller & Baker, 2020). Public health officials and leaders within the healthcare 
industry kept close watch on developments and began formulating contingency plans should 
the disease reach outbreak status within pockets of the country. Still, consensus revealed no 
understanding and little concern that this virus could or might wreak the havoc on the nation 
that it eventually did. When asked about whether they perceived a ‘wake-up call’ at any point 
during the early stages of the pandemic, most UPMC employees and leaders named the 
outbreaks in Washington state and New York as inflection points in the way that they thought 
about the disease. Neither of those states began reporting more than 100 cases per day until 
March 12th (The New York Times, 2020). 
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By mid-March, it was largely too late to ease into coronavirus-related restrictions; 
operations leaders, infectious disease experts, and regulators decided that, to stem the spread 
of the disease, change was needed immediately. At UPMC, a COVID-19 Command Center 
was opened in early March to coordinate resources and information across the system. This 
command center had many responsibilities, one of which was to be the go-to resource for 
employees who were concerned about exposure or had questions about safety in the workplace. 
Quite literally overnight on Sunday, March 15th, UPMC closed hospital entrances, 
implemented visitor restrictions and entrance screenings, and began suspending or cancelling 
some elective procedures. By Monday, March 16th, the command center phones were ringing 
off the hook.  
 
Figure 2. UPMC officials hold a media briefing at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic 
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Even at a premier medical center like UPMC Presbyterian Shadyside, healthcare was not 
prepared for this pandemic. Early on, there were significant concerns about supplies of 
personal protective equipment (PPE) and medical equipment. Much as there was a run on 
grocery and convenience stores to stockpile toilet paper, hand sanitizer, and non-perishable 
goods, hospitals experienced a run on their PPE. Employees began grabbing extra surgical 
masks, sometimes taking whole boxes that were left unattended. To preserve the supply chain, 
the hospital quarantined most of its PPE and allocated it to departments based on need and 
supply. Clinical laboratorians experienced shortages of the kits used to test patients for the 
virus that causes COVID-19. Even if they had enough tests, labs were not initially prepared 
with an appropriate number of hoods or analyzers to handle the volume of tests that they would 
need to perform.  
The needs for hospital preparedness during the early stages of the pandemic extend 
beyond clinical considerations, however. Public safety officers were deployed to facility 
entrances to enforce screening, masking, and visitor policies. Facilities and engineering teams 
were tasked with converting existing space into COVID-capable zones with negative pressure 
rooms and isolation areas. Environmental services (EVS) workers and housekeepers rethought 
workflows to allow for more frequent and more thorough cleaning. Volunteers were expelled 
from hospitals until it was deemed safe for them to return, and clinical education specialists 
rearranged and added classes to allow for distancing in classrooms while still enabling 
onboarding of new nurses. This account of changes merely brushes the surface of operational 
challenges posed by the pandemic, but it speaks to the tremendous undertaking that hospital 
leaders and front-line staff were faced with as they strove to keep facilities safe for everyone 
involved. 
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In this early stage of the pandemic, managing information was a challenge above and 
beyond operational concerns. Throughout the week that marked the beginning of pandemic 
operations, guidance from system leadership changed or was updated multiple times each day, 
sometimes within an hour. The day-to-day uncertainty engendered within healthcare workers 
significant fear, anxiety, apprehension, and – eventually – frustration. 
Importantly, Western Pennsylvania never faced the volume of infections, 
hospitalizations, and deaths that were seen in other states around the country, or even in Eastern 
Pennsylvania. From the beginning of March through the end of May, Allegheny County never 
recorded more than 100 COVID-19 cases on any single day (Allegheny County Health 
Department, 2020). UPMC, against state guidance, actually continued to offer some elective 
surgeries in cases where it was determined that delaying procedures could have adverse effects 
on patient safety and outcomes. Still, the massive undertaking of completely overhauling 
hospital operations in the span of a few days represented a tremendous burden on staff and 
hospital leadership. Unfortunately, as stressed as people were in March and April, the worst 
was yet to come. 
2.1 Second Phase: “Ramping-Up” Operations 
The state of healthcare in Western Pennsylvania April 2020 was bleak. UPMC Presbyterian 
Shadyside spent the better part of a month preparing for an onslaught of COVID-19 patients that 
never came. Patient volumes plummeted, and hospital revenue quickly followed suit. Not only 
were patients not coming in to hospitals for procedures, but many were also reluctant to go to 
doctors’ offices or clinics to receive outpatient care. Telemedicine vaulted into the spotlight as the 
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hospitals scrambled to get patients reconnected with their providers, but even with this boost, 
outpatient visits fell short of 2019 averages and 2020 targets. As it became clear that Pittsburgh 
was not going to be the next New York City, Seattle, or Philadelphia, UPMC turned its attention 
to “ramping-up”; operational leaders needed to figure out how to get patients back into the 
hospitals and clinics – and how to do so in the safest possible manner. 
Focus in April and May of 2020 shifted to the safety precautions that would be needed 
to ensure that a rebound of patient volume would not pose more risk than reward. Part of the 
difficulty in formalizing that notion was that stakeholders struggled to reach consensus on what 
operational practices were considered safe or not safe. In any novel situation, such as was faced 
with a once-in-century-pandemic, most people turn to the individuals that they perceive as the 
experts. In this case, epidemiologists, public health officials, and medical professionals had the 
most background expertise relevant to the subject. However, the lack of literature and 
precedent in the first few months of the pandemic posed a problem for consistency of 
messaging. Common themes emerged after a few weeks and were able to be agreed upon in 
short order – such as masking – but debate surrounding other approaches – such as the efficacy 
of social distancing and temperature screenings – continued for months.  
To complicate messaging difficulties, many were faced with a barrage of conflicting 
and sometimes incorrect or misleading information from news and social media. The inability 
of the federal government to take a firm stance in support of basic public health measures at 
the beginning of the pandemic forced individuals to institute proxy authorities of their choice. 
Even for those who worked or had backgrounds in healthcare, the disparate approach to the 
pandemic across states, municipalities, and hospitals or public health agencies engendered 
significant confusion and distrust. As a result, UPMC was faced with a rumor mill: community 
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members and staff alike began spreading claims that the system simply didn’t care about 
patients or staff safety, even as the hospitals struggled to enforce personal responsibility for 
masking and other safety precautions within their facilities. 
 
Figure 3. UPMC Shadyside hospital bridge 
Conflicting or unclear messaging from authority figures represented a significant stress 
for staff within the hospitals. The confusion did nothing to assuage the fear and anxiety that 
everyone was already experiencing. Patients were concerned about contracting illness while in 
hospital and immunocompromised; staff were worried about bringing illness home with them 
to their loved ones, some of whom were vulnerable. All of these concerns began piling on top 
of normal – and novel – job stresses. The dynamic of the ramp-up phase of operations was 
characterized by new responsibilities and workflows that were put in place while attempting 
to welcome patients back into care settings in volumes commensurate to the pre-pandemic 
months. The fundamental disconnect between workload and job expectations further weighed 
on clinical and non-clinical staff alike. Enhanced cleaning protocols, the adoption of entrance 
 11 
screenings, and enforcement of health and safety policies became job duties for all staff 
members. As a result, staff burnout became a serious concern as the pandemic extended into 
the summer months. 
Burnout concerns were only further exacerbated by staff quarantines. If a staff member 
was identified as having been exposed to a COVID-19 positive person, they were instructed to 
enter self-quarantines at home until it could be determined that they were healthy and posed 
no risk to other staff or patients. This was an important safety measure; in many departments, 
a staff member testing positive and exposing their colleagues could potentially shutter that 
department. In July, when multiple providers from one patient care unit at UPMC Presbyterian 
tested positive for the virus, the entire unit needed to be temporarily closed (WPXI News Staff, 
2020). In the face of nurse and clinical provider shortages – a trend that has been a concern 
within healthcare for years – hospitals could not afford to lose clinical staff to quarantines, 
especially during a public health crisis. Quarantines were concerning for non-clinical staff, as 
well, however. Facilities engineers, for example, are responsible for managing such operations 
as hospital boilers or chillers, and many have special knowledge of hospital-specific 
equipment. If the entire engineering department was quarantined, it would be unlikely that the 
hospital could quickly fill those positions with maintenance technicians with sufficient 
knowledge of the specific systems that run the hospital. Many managers had the foresight to 
split or stagger their staffed shifts to avoid such a catastrophic occurrence. Still, staff 
quarantines ticked up throughout the summer as a ‘second wave’ of the pandemic hit Western 
PA in July, and the staff who remained in care settings were often left to pick up the additional 
workload that was left behind.  
 12 
In addition to the stress and associated burnout that resulted from pandemic operations 
and staff quarantines, UPMC was forced to grapple with another novel workforce challenge: 
hospital employees were now working from home at unprecedented rates. In the first weeks of 
the pandemic, any staff who could perform their job duties from home were encouraged to do 
so. Additionally, some clinical staff – such as athletic trainers – had signifcantly fewer duties 
to perform as students left campuses and patients stayed home. While this workforce shift was 
well-suited to the initial phase of the pandemic, it became a significant human resources 
challenge in the late spring and beyond. As patients returned to in-person clinical visits and 
policy was adapted to allow one support-person to join patients in hospitals, there was greater 
need for employees to assist with screening, cleaning, and standard pre-pandemic clinical and 
non-clinical duties. However, even throughout the summer, UPMC struggled with striking a 
balance between brining staff back into on-site work settings, which tended to be more 
productive, and maintaining adherence to safety guidelines that limited the density within 
offices. 
All of the stresses and uncertainty that characterized the ramp-up phase of operations 
were compounded by the struggle to decide whether policies and procedures should be handled 
centrally by UPMC, or whether individual hospitals should make the choices that impact them 
directly. Initially, most tasks were handled centrally by UPMC’s Quality and Innovation team 
– the Wolff Center. However, as time went on, more and more tasks were delegated to 
individual hospitals. In part, this was out of necessity, as some of UPMC’s hospitals were 
outside of Pennsylvania, and thus subjected to different regulations. But a decentralized 
approach also allowed for local leadership to receive input from their teams and front-line staff 
and implement plans that were most relevant to them. The downside to this is that it continued 
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to pile more work on to already over-taxed local operational leaders. Now, front-line leaders 
were tasked with managing not only standard employee relations, but also enhanced safety and 
operational protocols. 
Each of the stresses experienced during this phase of the pandemic piled on top of one 
another, and some staff began to reach their limits. Some laboratorians, EVS workers, nurses, and 
administrators who felt overwhelmed or unsafe quit their jobs with little notice, leaving behind 
colleagues to pick up the slack and creating a downward spiral of stress, burnout, and turnover. 
Clinical and non-clinical staff shortages have been a pain point in hospitals for years, but fear of 
the pandemic meant that positions that were vacated during the last few months were even more 
difficult to fill than usual. The result was a workforce that became almost zombie-like: each day’s 
tasks were more like a list of chores, and staff would go through the motions with the hopes of 
simply not falling behind. Early in the summer, there was hope that a vaccine or some novel 
treatment was just around the corner, and normal life would be restored before the years’ end. As 
the summer turned to fall and the flu season approached, it became clear that the light at the end 
of the tunnel was still very far away. 
2.2 The Third Wave 
Beginning in late October 2020, Western Pennsylvania (and most of the United States) 
began to experience rising cases of COVID-19 infections, as well as commensurate increases in 
serious illness, hospitalizations, and deaths. Case counts that began slowly ticking up as students 
returned to school exploded following Halloween, when many are thought to have gathered in 
small and large groups to celebrate. These conditions were exacerbated as families and friends 
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gathered for the Thanksgiving and winter holidays. Many factors may have contributed to the 
sharp increase in infections in late 2020, but likely sources included pandemic fatigue, which led 
people to become more lackadaisical with safety precautions such as masking and social 
distancing; increasing time spent indoors as the weather in many parts of the country turned colder; 
and a false sense of security that led people to lower their guard when around small groups of 
friends and family members (Drake, 2020). 
 
Figure 4. COVID-19 infections and hospitalizations at UPMC, March 2020 through February 2021 
Regardless of the cause, one thing was certain: the “third wave” of the COVID-19 
pandemic was by far the worst that many Western Pennsylvania hospitals had seen to date. At 
UPMC, the number of COVID-19 positive patients in hospital exceeded that of any prior point 
during the pandemic by October 21. One month later, that case load had more than tripled, as 
had the number of patients in intensive care units and the number of patients on ventilators. By 
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the peak of the third wave in early December, Presbyterian Shadyside was admitting nearly 80 
new COVID patients each day while discharging only about half of that number. Nearly a 
dozen positive patients were dying each day by then.  
In contrast to the first and second waves of the pandemic, UPMC did not cancel or 
postpone any elective surgeries within their hospitals. This decision was made in part due to 
the potential ramifications for population health of delaying procedures. Even non-life-
threatening illnesses could have consequences for long-term wellbeing if not addressed in a 
timely and appropriate fashion. However, the financial standings of healthcare delivery 
institutions in this country were so dire in 2020 that there was serious concern that stand-alone 
and community hospitals were in real danger of closing, or at least signifcantly reducing 
operations. Even a large system like UPMC was desperate to keep surgical volumes from 
declining any more than they already have. As a result, beds filled, and hospital censuses rose 
to levels not seen before. Simultaneously, staff that had been exposed to the virus or who had 
a suspected exposure were forced into quarantine, leaving many units in hospitals tight on staff. 
Many employees elected to not take time off during this period as doing so would have negative 
consequences for their units’ abilities to function. In fact, over the course of the entire “peak 
phase” of the pandemic (defined as the period between April and December 2020), only 8% of 
surveyed employees at Presbyterian Shadyside reported taking any kind of leave, whether paid 
or unpaid. This dynamic compounded the already intense stress that staff experienced while 
working during the surge. 
Due to the magnitude of the wave that Pennsylvania witnessed in late-2020, many 
hospital workers described feeling more overwhelmed than they had at any point prior in the 
pandemic. According to the pandemic leadership survey distributed to all UPMC Presbyterian 
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Shadyside employees in March, 2021, during the peak phase of the pandemic, job satisfaction 
and motivation fell. Satisfaction declined from 85.9% pre-pandemic, to 80.7% by January 
2021, while those who were dissatisfied with their jobs rose from 4.7% to 12.5% (p = 0.0339, 
0.0002, respectively); motivation likewise fell from 88.0% to 80.2%, while lack of motivation 
rose from 2.6% to 10.4% (p = 0.0034, 0.0002, respectively). 
 
Figure 5. Employee satisfaction and motivation, pre-pandemic and current 
By early December 2020, the picture of public health in the United States was dismal. 
However, good news was on the horizon. On December 11th, 2020, the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) issued an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) for the 
Pfizer/BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine, effectively approving it for distribution and use in the 
United States (US Food and Drug Administration, 2021). One week later, the FDA also issued 
an EUA for the Moderna COVID-19 vaccine. By December 14, as the US death toll due to the 
pandemic topped 300,000 lives lost, the first dose of the Pfizer vaccine was administered to 
New York ICU nurse Sandra Lindsay. At the same time, millions of vials of vaccine were on 
their way to other hospitals across the country (BBC News, 2020). 
While the availability and distribution of vaccines was certainly a positive 
development, it did little to change on-the-ground operations in hospitals right away. It would 
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take months to get a sizable-enough proportion of the population immune, and that was 
assuming that most people would be willing to get a shot as soon as it became available to 
them. In the meantime, pandemic-related restrictions in hospitals, as well as in communities 
at-large, had to continue. Efforts to mitigate the spread of the virus seemed to pay off, however, 
and by the new year, infections and hospitalizations seemed to have declined significantly – at 
UPMC and across the country – although levels were still much higher than they had been 
before November. The effect on public health was palpable; not only were less people in 
hospitals sick with COVID-19, but healthcare workers began to feel hope again, spurred on by 
the United States’ rapid rollout of vaccines. Still, even as the situation in Western Pennsylvania 
and across the US improved, the pandemic had undeniable effects on the emotional wellbeing 
of millions of people – particularly those that work in healthcare – which could leave lasting 
scars (Shreffler, Huecker, & Petrey, 2020). 
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3.0 The COVID-19 Pandemic Today 
As of early April 2021, three vaccines to protect against COVID-19 infection have been 
approved for distribution in the United States: Pfizer/BioNTech, Moderna, and Janssen 
(Johnson & Johnson) (US Food and Drug Administration, 2021). The Pfizer and Moderna 
vaccines are both thought to be over 90% effective at preventing infection and virtually 100% 
effective at preventing serious illness and death. However, both of these vaccines require a 
second booster shot to be administered a few weeks after the first to realize the full benefits. 
In addition, both vaccines also require cold storage; in the case of the Pfizer vaccine, ultra-cold 
storage (-94 degrees Fahrenheit) is required to keep the vaccine from spoiling. While the 
Johnson & Johnson vaccine is somewhat less effective at protecting against the virus, it eases 
logistical concerns due to the fact that only one dose of the vaccine is required, and the vaccine 
can be kept at standard refrigerator temperature (Katella, 2021). To-date, UPMC has 
successfully vaccinated over 350,000 members of the community, as well as over 60,000 
members of their own staff. 
Initial roll out of vaccines had been challenging in many parts of the country, including 
in Pennsylvania. Poor coordination between various levels of government and the stakeholders 
involved in giving shots, as well as the sheer logistical difficulty of distributing millions of 
vaccines led to significant confusion on the part of hospitals and patients. As a result, there 
were numerous instances of vaccination appointment cancellations and expired doses of 
vaccines that occurred throughout early 2021 (Chinchilla, 2021). In addition, concern arose 
fairly quickly that health equity concerns were not being appropriately addressed. Hesitancy 
at taking the vaccines – attributable in part to misinformation and false claims about vaccine 
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safety – as well as historical distrust of the healthcare system among certain populations have 
played a role in unequitable vaccination rates, disfavoring already historically disadvantaged 
populations, such as minorities and low-income people (Ndugga et al., 2021).  
 
Figure 6. A UPMC employee receives a COVID-19 vaccine in December 2020 
While hospitals had little control over government allocations of vaccines, they 
certainly did have an important role to play when it came to distributing doses equitably and 
engaging hard-to-reach populations. At UPMC, leaders have vowed to open up the dialogue 
surrounding vaccine equity and come up with real solutions in April, which is National 
Minority Health month. In February, the system began to partner with local faith- and 
community-based organizations to distribute doses to vulnerable and hard-to-reach 
populations. The conversation around vaccines is ongoing today, and all stakeholders will need 
to continue to be engaged in order to ensure that rollout is viewed as a great success in years 
to come. Some experts predict that we might not return to ‘normal’ life until at least November 
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2021 (Knowledge at Wharton, 2020), and some practices that have been adopted over the past 
few months may never go away. Still, there are many other opportunities to reflect and learn 
from the myriad ways in which hospital operations have changed since the beginning of the 
pandemic. 
3.1 Reflection on Operational Response to the Pandemic 
Changes to hospital operations throughout 2020 and in to 2021 have been marked and 
rapid. The very infrastructure of hospitals has changed, as the demand for negative pressure 
rooms surged in the early days of the pandemic and managers worked to rearrange the flow of 
patients, support persons, and staff through hospital and clinic spaces. Use of telemedicine 
services for patient care has taken off, although the future of telemedicine is still unclear. In 
addition to clinical operations, the nature of office work in hospitals and other delivery settings 
has experienced a virtual overhaul. This has decreased the demand on office space in healthcare 
settings and has leaders questioning what the right balance between remote and on-site work 
is to achieve maximal employee productivity and engagement. All of these factors pose 
questions for the future, but those questions should be viewed through a lens of understanding 
the past. 
One of the most important factors in hospital operations since March 2020 has been 
communication. Information changed at a rapid pace throughout this year, but especially 
during the first phase of pandemic operations. Conveying this information quickly and 
effectively was a major challenge for leaders at UPMC Presbyterian Shadyside. Daily “Covid 
Calls” kept operational stakeholders up-to-date on the newest developments, but at times the 
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pace of information change was overwhelming for front-line staff. Departmental directors and 
managers were tasked with parsing through information to determine what was both new and 
relevant to their operations. This information sorting consumed valuable time that could 
scarcely be afforded, particularly as volumes picked up and standard duties became more 
stressful. Additionally, communicating in a way that everyone could understand was difficult 
at UPMC. The novelty of the situation meant that very few people – clinical providers and 
technicians included – were familiar with the scientific or medical jargon that was being used. 
Politicization of a public health crisis – a decidedly apolitical problem – further served to 
undermine the efficacy of common sense and science-backed best practices in public health. 
The novelty of the pandemic combined with disparate messaging across governments, provider 
networks, and social media made quality information less accessible to people and, ultimately, 
added to the fear and apprehension that staff and community members were already 
experiencing. 
Another major challenge that UPMC faced throughout the pandemic has been to 
determine which operations decisions should be centralized, and which should be delegated to 
individual hospitals. This debate was not just being held at care delivery sites, either. Part of 
the confusion as it pertained to messaging during the pandemic stemmed from a federal 
government that was generally unsupportive of national control of the response. In turn, state-
by-state, county-by-county, and even hospital-by-hospital approaches were developed that led 
to disjointed operations across the nation and disparate health outcomes dependent on the 
particular location in question. As previously mentioned, the centralized vs. decentralized 
debate led to a significant amount of contention, some of which remains unresolved. From a 
front-line staff perspective, this lack of consistency and decisiveness has contributed to general 
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confusion, and may have even prompted distrust in hospital and corporate leadership: 22% of 
respondents to the pandemic leadership survey at UPMC said that the pandemic has changed 
the way that they view UPMC for the worse. Staff distrust was only fortified by misinformation 
that circulated online and in the news media. Effective management of the pandemic in 
hospitals quickly became as much about debunking false and potentially damaging claims as 
it was about managing people and facilities safely.  
In times of emergency, people also tend to turn to governments and policy officials for 
guidance and protection. The general lack of a coordinated national approach to the pandemic 
in the United States early on meant that each state had the agency to implement its own policies. 
Once again, staff and patients alike were faced with a confusing blend of conflicting 
approaches across states and health systems. The action and inaction of the government is 
largely out of the hands of individuals and corporations like UPMC, but consumers and 
producers of healthcare alike tend to mostly express concerns as they pertain to the arenas that 
are most salient to them or easiest for them to influence. This became problematic when it 
came to PPE shortages or lack of testing infrastructure. The community placed blame for these 
resource challenges on UPMC, but in reality, testing and PPE supplies were regulated and 
restricted by state and federal governments. Resource constraints continue to be a very real and 
very complex challenge, but a cursory glance doesn’t reveal that every step of pandemic 
planning has been a collaborative effort among hospitals, health plans, pharmaceutical 
companies, public health experts, and many more.  
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3.2 Recommendations for the Future 
3.2.1  Unity of Response to a National (and Global) Crisis 
First and foremost, it is time to recognize that a national disaster on this scale 
requires a concerted, unified response by the government in collaboration with non-
governmental stakeholders. The federal response to the pandemic was delayed and 
lackluster, and considerable onus was put on states to develop and enforce public health 
regulations and grapple with supply chain difficulties on their own. While there are other 
arguments to be had regarding state versus federal governments rights and responsibilities, 
it is important to recognize that crises to the scale of a pandemic cannot be dealt with in a 
partisan political manner, because viruses do not heed political boundaries. The federal 
government has the greatest access to the resources needed to combat public health crises 
on a national level, and so it is the responsibility of the federal government to deploy those 
resources as quickly, equitably, and efficiently as possible. After these resources are made 
available to whomever needs them most, additional conversations around delegating 
powers to lower levels of government may occur. 
3.2.2  Aid for Ailing Hospitals and Systems 
The economic incentives currently in play do not lend themselves to the long-term 
sustainability of the healthcare sector, but those incentives can be changed. Limiting 
unnecessary medical activity in the face of a pandemic protects the health of the public, 
and incentivizing working in hospitals would also revitalize the healthcare workforce. 
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Hospitals cannot shoulder the entire cost of such policies by themselves, however. Rural 
hospitals or those that serve complex populations were already financially strained prior to 
2020, and the added stress of the pandemic raises concerns that some healthcare institutions 
will not be able to recover. Government aid in the form of subsidies to halt elective 
procedures and hazard pay for healthcare workers are ways to ensure that the US health 
system can meet the needs of the populace during crises times and in the years that follow. 
3.2.3  Smart HR Solutions to Address Burnout 
Healthcare delivery organizations can take action to support themselves, too. 
Leaders need to recognize when their staffs are stressed, burned out, and at their limits. 
Smart human resources solutions need to be evaluated and implemented quickly, before 
the stresses of working in a hospital leave indelible scars on the workforce. Regular review 
of overtime and paid sick leave or time off is warranted, and care should be taken to ensure 
that no employees are overexerting themselves (Carriere et al., 2020). Expansion of 
benefits such as child care will also go far in improving the flexibility of the workforce to 
meet the changing dynamic of pandemic operations. At its core, though, strong leadership 
is about understanding employees needs and challenges. Managers, directors, and 
executives all need to be prepared to listen more and directly address what their staff is 
saying. No leaders should ask their employees to do something that they themselves would 
not do; simple acts such as helping to clean inpatient rooms or supporting clinical staff on 
a unit can go a long way in demonstrating commitment to the people that allow hospitals 
to run. 
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3.2.4  A Clear, Comprehensive Plan for Work-from-Home 
Human resources also needs to continue to be engaged with multiple other 
operational stakeholders as non-clinical staff begin to return from remote work. As the 
virus spread throughout the community in March 2020, many non-essential staff that were 
able to complete their job duties from home were encouraged to do so. However, as viral 
case loads continue to decline and leaders recognize that working in offices – especially 
hospital-based offices – can be made very safe, employers will need to come up with 
standardized policies for work-from-home functions. The worst course of action would be 
the “do nothing” approach; lack of standardization of policy early on has raised concerns 
about abuses of work-from-home and declining employee engagement and productivity. 
While there are clear benefits to working remotely, and smart work-from-home policy may 
actually boost productivity and job satisfaction, lack of consistency makes managing these 
employees very challenging (Lucanus, 2021). As such, developing consistent policy – and 
recognizing that these novel policies should not necessarily be rigid – will be crucial to 
successful management of the workforce of the future. 
3.2.5  Policy and Procedure to Ensure Vaccine Equity 
As it pertains to the development and distribution of vaccines, both governmental 
and private stakeholders can take steps to ensure that all stakeholders have equitable access 
to safe, effective vaccines. Operation Warp Speed was an early win in this fight, but 
ongoing funding and direction from the federal government is needed for follow through 
coordination (Shulkin, 2021). That being said, it is important to recognize that local care 
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delivery organizations are perhaps the best equipped to meet the needs of the communities 
that they already serve. Some of the most successful states at distributing vaccines have 
been those that have been able to reach their hard-to-reach populations by bringing doses 
to those populations and not expecting those populations to come find the doses at a 
centralized distribution site.  
3.2.6  Commitment to the Betterment of Public Health 
Perhaps most importantly, leadership at every level of every stakeholder group in 
this country must remain resolute and demonstrate that we are united in our will to tackle 
the pandemic and demonstrate commitment to public health at large. We have learned 
much from the past year, and it would be tragic if we did not implement real change to 
reflect what we have learned. Healthcare delivery and public health have traditionally 
operated in silos, but this cannot be the dynamic any longer. Particularly as healthcare 
grows to be more value-based and population-focused, providers will need to include 
public health partners in decision making and strategic planning processes if they hope to 
achieve the greatest benefit for the population. Similarly, public health leaders and 
advocates will need to include healthcare delivery stakeholders in population health 
management and disaster planning and response, as these stakeholders are perhaps best 
equipped to determine which interventions are the most feasible. 
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4.0 Conclusion 
By the end of 2020, many healthcare leaders had the sense that hospitals were sitting 
on a powder keg. While the situation has undeniably improved since then, it is not clear that 
the underlying issues facing the industry have as of yet been fully addressed. The short-term 
operational responses to the pandemic that were implemented in March 2020 are simply not 
sustainable for months on end, much less for over a year. By December, staff were hopelessly 
burned out and many were scared. Stretching their capabilities when many were already at a 
breaking point drew intense criticism, and many were worried that operational choices made 
in 2020 have destabilize the industry in the long run. Vaccines have provided many with a 
sense of security that they have not felt for many months, but the pandemic is not over. 
Healthcare is still in crisis, and the financial standing of delivery institutions in this country 
poses a risk to the safety and wellbeing of American people. Recent wobbles in the progress 
that has been made with respect to reducing infections and hospitalizations have highlighted 
these concerns. The current trajectory of the industry paints a grim picture; if action is not 
taken, hospital will close, and closures will happen more rapidly in already-underserved rural 
communities (Tribble, 2020). Still, there is hope; policies still exist that have not been 
implemented or implemented fully that may serve to improve the long-term sustainability of 
the sector. 
The policy recommendations outlined above are high-level and do not reflect the 
complexities that adoption and implementation will require, and a few short paragraphs are 
certainly not reflective of an exhaustive list of effective policy measures. There will be no one 
silver bullet to end the pandemic or revitalize hospital operations in this country; rather, any 
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progress made will by necessity need to be a product of collaboration and incrementalism. There 
remains much work yet to be done to secure the future of the healthcare industry, but what has 
been accomplished in the face of travesty is a feat in itself. Anyone who works in healthcare should 
be proud to be a part of an institution that has improved the lives of millions. The future remains 





Appendix A Pandemic Leadership Survey 
Pandemic Leadership Survey 
 
Section 1 
1. What is your age? 
[Text response] 
 





Prefer not to disclose 
 
3. Which UPMC hospital do your currently work at? 
[Select from dropdown] 





I do not work in a hospital 
Other 
 
4. At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, where were you working? 
[Choose one] 
At the same hospital that I am currently at 
At a different UPMC hospital 
At a different non-UPMC hospital 
In healthcare, but not in a hospital 
Not in healthcare 
 
5. How long have you worked in healthcare? 
[Choose one] 
Less than 1 year 
1-5 years 
6-10 years 
More than 10 years 
 
6. How long have you worked for UPMC? 
[Choose one] 




More than 10 years 
 
7. Which of the following best describes your current role? (Select all that apply) 
[Select multiple] 
I work in patient areas and provide clinical care 
I work in patient areas, but I do not provide clinical care 
I work in a clinical setting, but do not often interact directly with patients 
I work in a non-clinical setting that is near patients 
I work in a non-clinical setting that is not near patients 






















10. How concerned were you for the health and safety of yourself or your loved ones during 









11. How good of a job do you feel that UPMC did in changing basic hospital functions and 










12. How good of a job do you feel that UPMC did in responding to the needs of their 









13. What, if anything, do you think UPMC did well in their response to the pandemic? 
[Text response] 
 




15. How motivated did you feel to come to work at UPMC each day during the height of the 









16. How often did you consider leaving your position at UPMC as a direct result of the stress 









17. During the height of the pandemic (April to December, 2020), did you take paid or 
unpaid leave to attempt to recover from the stress of work? 
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[Choose one] 
I took paid leave 
I took unpaid leave 
I took both paid and unpaid leave 
I took neither paid nor unpaid leave 
N/A 
 
18. Please provide any other comments you may have about UPMC's actions during the first 
































22. How much do you trust UPMC to appropriately respond to a public health emergency, 






Not very much 
Not at all 
N/A 
 






Not very much 
Not at all 
N/A 
 






Not very much 
Not at all 
N/A 
 
















26. Please provide any other comments you may have regarding the topic of this survey. 
[Text response].  
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Appendix B Pandemic Leadership Survey Comment Word Cloud 
 
Figure 7. Word cloud of staff comments from the Pandemic Leadership Survey 
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Appendix C  Selected Pandemic Leadership Survey Results 
Appendix C.1 Question 10  
How concerned were you for the health and safety of yourself or your loved ones during the height 
of the COVID-19 pandemic (April to December, 2020)? 
 







Appendix C.2 Question 16 
How often did you consider leaving your position at UPMC as a direct result of the stress of the 
pandemic? 
 
Figure 9. Survey question 16 responses 
Appendix C.3 Question 17 
During the height of the pandemic (April to December, 2020), did you take paid or unpaid leave 
to attempt to recover from the stress of work? 
 
Figure 10. Survey question 16 responses 
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Appendix C.4 Question 25 
Please select some words below that describe how you feel when thinking about the future. 
 
Figure 11. Survey question 25 responses 
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